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Abstract
We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players’ perceived prize valuations in
contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize’s
material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between the
behavior evolutionarily stable preferences induce and evolutionarily stable strategies.
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1 Introduction
In a contest, players compete by making irrecoverable investments of expenditure or effort to
influence their probability of winning a prize. The most-studied forms in the contest theory
literature are “Tullock” contests where each player’s winning probability is her expenditure’s
share of total expenditure (Tullock, 1980) and all-pay auctions where the player making the
largest expenditure wins for certain (Baye et al., 1996). Contest theory applies to many
topics, including rent-seeking and lobbying for political favors, conflict, litigation, R&D
competition and patent races, sporting competition, and charitable fundraising.1 Much
of the contest theory literature studies the symmetric case where players have the same
valuation that matches exactly the material value of the prize at stake.2 Players, however,
may have asymmetric prize values that also may differ from a prize’s material value because
of, for example, nonpecuniary utility of winning, emotions, or interdependent preferences.3
Understanding behavior (and the preferences driving that behavior) in contests is im-
portant not only because of the many applications of contest theory outlined above, but
also because expenditures often exceed risk-neutral Nash equilibrium levels in experimental
contests.4 We address this overexpenditure observation by drawing upon the indirect evo-
lutionary approach of Gu¨th and Yaari (1992) in which players optimize given preferences
and preferences evolve according to the fitness they induce. We study the evolution of play-
ers’ perceived prize valuations in pairwise contests and identify cases where evolutionarily
stable preferences do and do not overstate the material value of the prize and, thus, where
induced behavior does and does not lead to overexpenditure. We also establish an equiva-
lence between the behavior evolutionarily stable preferences induce and evolutionarily stable
strategies.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on evolutionary approaches to contest
theory. Leininger (2003) and Hehenkamp et al. (2004) study evolutionarily stable strategies
1On these applications of contest theory, see Tullock (1980) and Baye et al. (1993) on rent-seeking and
lobbying, Hirshleifer (1995) and Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) and the references therein on conflict, Farmer
and Pecorino (1999) and Baye et al. (2005) on litigation, Baye and Hoppe (2003) on innovation tournaments
and patent races, Szymanski (2003) on sporting competition, and Morgan (2000) and Goeree et al. (2005) on
the use of contests for charitable fundraising. Nitzan (1994) and Corcho´n (2007) provide surveys of contest
theory more generally.
2For exceptions, see Hillman and Riley (1989), Baik (1994), Baye et al. (1996), Nti (1999), Fang (2002),
and Stein (2002) on asymmetric valuations.
3Sheremeta (2010) provides evidence of nonpecuniary utility of winning and Herrmann and Orzen (2008)
provide evidence of spiteful preferences in experimental contests.
4See, for example, O¨ncu¨ler and Croson (2005), Ho¨risch and Kirchkamp (2010), Morgan et al. (2010), and
the literature cited in these papers for an overview. Interestingly, even Potters et al. (1998), who correct for
design flaws in earlier contest experiments, find evidence of overexpenditure in their “Tullock” contests.
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in contests and show that they exceed risk-neutral Nash equilibrium levels when evolution
occurs in finite populations. Among the papers studying the evolution of preferences in
contests are Wa¨rneryd (2002) on risk attitudes, Eaton and Eswaran (2003) and Leininger
(2009) on interdependent preferences, Konrad (2004) and Schmidt (2009) on altruism and
envy, and Mohlin (2010) on conflict-reducing norms.
2 Model and Results
Each period, players from a population of size N ≥ 2 match pairwise to compete in a
simultaneous-move one-shot contest with a prize of material value v > 0. Players compete
by submitting irrecoverable expenditures xi ≥ 0 to influence their probability of winning,
which is given by
pi(x1, x2) :=
 xix1+x2 if x1 + x2 > 01
2
otherwise
(1)
for i = 1, 2; see Skaperdas (1996) and Kooreman and Schoonbeek (1997) for axiomatizations
of this well-known contest success function from Tullock (1980).
Preferences are endowed with a perceived value of the prize, vi > 0, i = 1, 2, which
may differ from v. Evolution operates upon the perceived prize valuations in this model.
Each player selects xi to maximize expected utility, given by
EUi(x1, x2) :=
xi
x1 + x2
vi − xi (2)
for i = 1, 2. The following lemma characterizes equilibrium expenditure behavior when an
arbitrary pair of players are matched to compete in a contest.
Lemma 1. The unique Nash equilibrium expenditures when players with prize valuations v1
and v2 compete in a contest are given by
x∗i (v1, v2) =
v2i vj
(v1 + v2)2
(3)
for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Proof. The proof is identical to proofs in Nti (1999) and Fang (2002) and hence is omitted.
From (3), it is clear that the player with the larger perceived prize valuation makes a
larger expenditure and has a higher probability of winning in equilibrium. Of course, the
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fitness a player’s behavior induces governs the preferences selected as evolutionarily stable.
In following the literature on the indirect evolution of preferences–e.g., Gu¨th and Yaari
(1992) and Leininger (2009) among others–we equate fitness with expected material payoffs.
A player’s preferences (expected utility) differ from fitness (expected material payoff) to
the extent that a player’s perceived prize valuation differs from the prize’s material value.
Equilibrium behavior characterized by (3) induces fitness given by
Fi(v1, v2) =
x∗i (v1, v2)
x∗1(v1, v2) + x
∗
2(v1, v2)
v − x∗i (v1, v2) (4)
=
v2i v + vivjv − v2i vj
(v1 + v2)2
for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that player 2 is a member of a finite population
endowed with the evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) v∗ and that player 1 is a single
mutant with preferences v1. A single mutant will always match with a member of the
population with v∗ and a member of the population with v∗ will match with the mutant
with probability 1/(N − 1). Therefore, the fitness of player 1 relative to a member of the
population with v∗ is given by
R1(v1, v
∗) = F1(v1, v∗)−
(
1
N − 1F2(v1, v
∗) +
N − 2
N − 1F2(v
∗, v∗)
)
. (5)
We follow Eaton and Eswaran (2003) and Leininger (2009) in adapting the definition of finite
population evolutionary stability from Schaffer (1988) and define finite population ESP v∗
as
v∗ ∈ arg max
v1
R1(v1, v
∗). (6)
The following proposition characterizes ESP for finite populations.
Proposition 1. For a finite population interacting in pairwise contests, the unique evolu-
tionarily stable preferences v∗ overstate the material value of the prize. Namely,
v∗ =
N
N − 1v > v. (7)
Proof. For a finite population, the first-order condition for the problem in (6) is
v1v
∗v + v∗2v − 2v1v∗2
(v1 + v∗)3
− 1
N − 1
−v1v∗v + v1v∗2 − v∗2v − v∗3
(v1 + v∗)3
= 0. (8)
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Setting v1 = v
∗ in (8) and solving for v∗ yields (7).
To establish this unique interior solution as the unique global maximizer of relative
fitness in (5), note that the second-order condition is given by
−2v1v∗v − 2v∗2v + 4v1v∗2 − 2v∗3
(v1 + v∗)4
− 1
N − 1
2v1v
∗v + 2v∗2v − 2v1v∗2 + 4v∗3
(v1 + v∗)4
< 0. (9)
Setting v1 = v
∗ = Nv/(N − 1), substituting into (9), and simplifying reveals that the
second-order condition holds if and only if
−Nv − N
N − 1v < 0,
and thus the second-order condition holds at the interior solution. Substituting v∗ =
Nv/(N − 1) into (9) and simplifying reveals that the second-order condition holds if and
only if
v1 − N + 3− 2/N
N − 1 v < 0
so that relative fitness in (5) is concave for v1 ∈ (0, v˜) and convex for v1 ∈ (v˜,∞), where
v˜ =
N + 3− 2/N
N − 1 v >
N
N − 1v = v
∗.
Comparing the relative fitness of the interior solution v∗ = Nv/(N − 1) to the relative
fitness of the corner solution 0, we have R1(v
∗, v∗) = 0 and R1(0, v∗) = −N2/4(N − 1)2 < 0,
respectively. Thus, (7) is the unique global maximizer of (5).
Relative fitness maximization provides the intuition for why finite population ESP
overstate the material value of the prize. Preferences overstating the material value of
the prize commit a player to making a relatively larger expenditure in the contest than
a player whose preferences match exactly the material value of the prize. The increased
contest expenditure creates a second-order loss in own fitness but a first-order loss in the
rival player’s fitness through the negative externality of expenditures in the contest success
function in (1); together, these effects constitute an increase in relative fitness and thus an
evolutionary advantage for preferences overstating the material value of the prize.
The above intuition for finite population ESP does not hold for infinite populations;
for infinite populations, evolutionary selection is based upon absolute fitness. Analogous
to the case of finite populations, we adapt the definition of infinite population evolutionary
stability from Maynard Smith and Price (1973) and define infinite population ESP as the
v∗∗ for which (i) F1(v∗∗, v∗∗) ≥ F1(v1, v∗∗) for all v1 and (ii) F1(v∗∗, v∗∗) > F1(vˆ, vˆ) for all vˆ
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such that F1(vˆ, v
∗∗) = F1(v∗∗, v∗∗); symmetric conditions hold for player 2. The following
proposition characterizes ESP for infinite populations.
Proposition 2. For an infinite population interacting in pairwise contests, the unique evo-
lutionarily stable preferences v∗∗ match exactly the material value of the prize so that
v∗∗ = v. (10)
Proof. Taking the perspective of player 1, infinite population ESP solve
max
v1
F1(v1, v
∗∗) =
v21v + v1v
∗∗v − v21v∗∗
(v1 + v∗∗)2
; (11)
evolution solves a symmetric problem for player 2, so taking the perspective of player 1 is
without loss of generality. The first-order condition for the problem in (11) is
v1v
∗∗v + v∗∗2v − 2v1v∗∗2
(v1 + v∗∗)3
= 0. (12)
Setting v1 = v
∗∗ in (12) and simplifying yields
v − v∗∗
4v∗∗
= 0, (13)
which is satisfied by v∗∗ = v as in (10).
To establish this unique interior solution as the unique global maximizer of (11), note
that the second-order condition is given by
−2v1v∗∗v − 2v∗∗2v + 4v1v∗∗2 − 2v∗∗3
(v1 + v∗∗)4
< 0. (14)
Setting v1 = v
∗∗ = v, substituting into (14), and simplifying reveals that the second-order
condition holds if and only if
− 1
8v
< 0,
and thus the second-order condition holds at the interior solution. Substituting v∗∗ = v into
(14) and simplifying reveals that the second-order condition holds if and only if
v1 − 2v < 0
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so that absolute fitness in (11) is concave for v1 ∈ (0, ˜˜v) and convex for v1 ∈ (˜˜v,∞), where
˜˜v = 2v > v = v∗∗.
Comparing the relative fitness of the interior solution v∗∗ = v to the absolute fitness of the
corner solution 0, we have F1(v
∗∗, v∗∗) = v/4 > 0 and F1(0, v∗∗) = 0, respectively. Thus, (10)
is the unique global maximizer of (11).
Again, considering absolute fitness maximization as the target of evolution in infinite
populations provides the intuition for why infinite population ESP match exactly the material
value of the prize. A mutant is measure zero in an infinite population, so any mutant whose
preferences understate (overstate) the material value of the prize imposes only a loss on own
fitness from its decreased (increased) expenditure. Therefore, preferences that do not match
exactly the material value of the prize are at an evolutionary disadvantage.
A tight link exists between the behavior ESP induce and the strategies evolution would
select were it to act directly upon behavior (evolutionarily stable strategies, ESS) in pairwise
contests. From (3), finite population ESP induce the expenditure behavior
x∗
(
N
N − 1v,
N
N − 1v
)
=
N
4(N − 1)v
and infinite population ESP induce the expenditure behavior
x∗(v, v) =
v
4
.
From Hehenkamp et al. (2004), it is well-known that the finite population ESS for pairwise
contests is
xESSN =
N
4(N − 1)v
and that the infinite population ESS for pairwise contests is
xESS∞ =
v
4
.
We record this equivalence in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Evolutionarily stable preferences from indirect evolution in pairwise contests
induce behavior that is equivalent to the evolutionarily stable strategies from direct evolution
in pairwise contests.
Leininger (2009) obtains an analogous equivalence result for the evolution of interde-
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pendent preferences (namely, the weight a player’s preferences place upon a rival player’s
expected material payoff). Our result suggests that the equivalence between the behavior
ESP induce and ESS in pairwise contests is robust. The result is also a complement to
Leininger (2009) since we establish that this equivalence holds for a class of independent
preferences where evolution acts upon players’ perceived prize valuations.
3 Conclusion
If evolution acts upon the perceived prize valuations of members of a finite population
interacting in pairwise contests, then preferences will evolve to overstate the material value
of the prize. These evolutionarily stable preferences thus provide a qualitative rationale for
the overexpenditure observed in experimental contests. If, instead, evolution works upon
the preferences of members from an infinite population, evolutionarily stable preferences
will evolve to match exactly the prize’s material value. The difference in these results arises
from a mutant’s ability (inability) to improve relative fitness in finite (infinite) populations by
perceiving the value of winning a contest as more than the material value of the prize. Should
evolution instead work directly upon strategies, then the evolutionarily stable strategies are
equivalent to the behavior evolutionarily stable preferences induce. We leave for future
research the determination of general conditions under which the behavior evolutionarily
stable preferences induce is equivalent to evolutionarily stable strategies in contests.
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